Security

Encrypted before it leaves your machine.

Every payload is sealed on the client, keyed over a quantum channel, and unwrapped only inside an audited request. This page is an outline of that pipeline — replace the wording with your own before launch.

  1. 01

    Encrypt at the client

    AES-256-GCM

    Payloads are sealed in the browser before anything leaves the device, using AES-256-GCM with a per-session key. The server receives ciphertext and an authentication tag; it never sees the plaintext or the key.

  2. 02

    Exchange the key

    E91 · QKD

    The session key is agreed over a quantum key distribution channel using the E91 protocol. Entangled photon pairs are measured at both ends; any interception collapses the state and shows up as an error-rate spike before a single byte is sent.

  3. 03

    Wrap for transport

    TLS 1.3 + ML-KEM

    The sealed payload travels over TLS 1.3 with a post-quantum hybrid handshake. Even if the classical layer is broken retrospectively, the inner envelope and its QKD-derived key remain sound.

  4. 04

    Store sealed

    HSM · FIELD-LEVEL

    At rest, records stay encrypted under a key held in an HSM and never written to disk. Field-level encryption means an operator with database access sees ciphertext, not contact details.

  5. 05

    Decrypt on demand

    AUDITED UNWRAP

    Decryption happens only inside an authenticated request, scoped to the record being read, and every unwrap is written to an append-only audit log with the actor, time and reason.

IN TRANSIT
TLS 1.3 + ML-KEM hybrid
AT REST
AES-256-GCM, HSM-held keys
KEY EXCHANGE
E91 quantum distribution

Common questions

Why does quantum key distribution matter?+

Classical key exchange is secure because certain maths is expensive today. A sufficiently large quantum computer changes that. QKD does not rely on hardness assumptions at all — it relies on the fact that measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so eavesdropping is detectable by physics rather than by algorithm.

What about data captured today and broken later?+

Harvest-now-decrypt-later is the real risk for anything with a long confidentiality horizon. That is why the inner envelope uses a QKD-derived key rather than depending on the transport layer, and why the handshake is post-quantum hybrid rather than classical alone.

Which standards are used?+

NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key encapsulation and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) for signatures, alongside conventional primitives so a weakness in either family alone is not fatal.

Who can read my scan results?+

Your own account, and the operators you explicitly grant access to. Scan results are encrypted per client, so cross-tenant reads are not possible even with database access.